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INTRODUCTION
A 2016 headline from the CHICAGO TRIBUNE reads “Church
Employee Fired Over Same-Sex Marriage Sues Chicago
Archdiocese.”1 At first glance, it appears that the church was legally in
the wrong. After all, it was only in 2021 that the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Title VII protects workers against discrimination on the basis
of their sexual orientation. 2 However, upon closer inspection, the
question becomes murkier. In contrast with Title VII, the source of
workplace discrimination claims,3 the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment protect the religious liberty of the religious institution:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

 J.D. candidate, May 2022, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; M.S.L., 2019, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law; B.S. in French &
Francophone Studies and Cellular & Molecular Biology, 2018, University of
Michigan.
1 Chicago Tribune Staff, Church Employee Fired Over Same-Sex Marriage
Sues Chicago Archdiocese, CHI. TRIBUNE (March 8, 2016 11:15 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct–gay–man–sues–catholic–church–
met–20160307–story.html.
2 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020)
3 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2 et. seq. (1991).
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or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”4 The Catholic Church, at
least according to its official canon, disapproves of gay marriage. 5 A
clash may easily emerge between the right of a gay minister to be free
of discrimination at his workplace and the right of a Catholic parishemployer to respect its own religious beliefs.
Enter Mr. Demkovich. Mr. Demkovich was fired from his
position as choir director and organist at St. Andrew the Apostle
Parish in Calumet City, Illinois.6 He alleged that his firing was the
direct result of his engagement and subsequent marriage to a man
(now his husband).7 The case was immediately dismissed by the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.8 The Supreme
Court recently held that ministers cannot bring employment actions for
their hiring or firing because the First Amendment protects the
religious liberty of religious institutions to choose who ministers to
their flock.9 However, the question was left open by the Supreme
Court as to whether ministers could sue other ministers for hostile
work environment claims.10 Therefore, Mr. Demkovich repackaged
and re-brought his suit: rather than alleging employment
4

U.S. CONST. amend. I cl. 1.
See Catechism 2396, Catechism of the Catholic Church, U.S. CONF. BISHOPS,
available online at
https://www.usccb.org/sites/default/files/flipbooks/catechism/578/ (last accessed
Dec. 3, 2021) (“Among the sins gravely contrary to chastity are . . . homosexual
practice.”).
6 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th
Cir. 2021)
7 Id. at 973–74.
8 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 2017 WL 4339817
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2018).
9 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171 (2012); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.
Ct. 2049 (2020).
10 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“Today we hold only that the ministerial
exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious
conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”).
5
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discrimination as a result of his firing, he alleged instead a hostile
work environment claim due to the invidious harassment he
experienced at the hands of the Reverend Dada, also a minister of the
parish.11
The Seventh Circuit’s answer to that open question, after the
dust settled,12 was a flat no.13 The Seventh Circuit sitting en banc held
in Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, Calumet City that, as a
categorical matter, hostile work environment suits brought by
ministers are barred under the ministerial exception in the same way
that the ministerial exception bars suits related to the hiring and firing
of ministers.14 This means that if a minister is the subject of invidious
discrimination at the hands of another minister, whether it be because
of his or her race, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or
any other protected characteristic, he or she lacks the ability to bring
suit. The major arguments endorsed by the Seventh Circuit concern
the court’s hesitance to intrude into the realm of religious doctrine by
staying out of it altogether. However, a case-by-case, middle-ground
approach that is sensitive to the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause issues raised in employment suits by and between ministers
was properly executed by the District Court and should have been
adopted by the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc.
This Comment advocates for a case-by-case approach to the
ministerial exception in workplace harassment suits, rather than a
categorical bar of the claims altogether. A case-by-case analysis
protects the individual right of workers to be free from workplace
harassment while still respecting religious institutions’15 right to
11

Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 973–74.
The protracted litigation had no less than two District Court orders, a three–
judge panel opinion of the Seventh Circuit, and a rehearing en banc. See Demkovich,
3 F.4th at 982.
13 Id. at 985.
14 Id.
15 As used in this Comment, “religious institution” and “church” are
interchangeable because the main actor in this case was the St. Andrew the Apostle
Parish of the Catholic Church. In other contexts, another title for a religious
institution may be more appropriate.
12
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religious liberty. Accordingly, Part I will recount the history of the
ministerial exception. As it stands, two recent U.S. Supreme Court
cases dictate the contours of the ministerial exception to employment
discrimination suits. Understanding how the Religion Clauses operate
in these two cases will better refract how religious liberty is discussed
in the Seventh Circuit. Part II will trace the twin threads of the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause through each level of
appeal of Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, Calumet City.
Part III will analyze the decision of the Seventh Circuit by discussing
the decisions of other Courts of Appeals and the conflicting dialogue
between the majority and the dissenting opinions in the Seventh
Circuit’s rehearing en banc. Ultimately, this Comment will conclude
that the case-by-case analysis performed by the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois is the approach the Seventh Circuit
should have adopted in a confusing and sometimes counterintuitive
area of the law.
PART I
THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The ministerial exception is a judicially created doctrine of
Constitutional law that broadly insulates religious institutions from
employment–related suits 16 brought against them by their ministers. 17
The authority for the exception is derived from the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment18: if the government were allowed to instruct
religious institutions to retain or fire their ministers, the Free Exercise

16

See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 982.
See generally Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City, 3
F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
18 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.
171, 194 (2012) (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the
exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment
discrimination suit against her religious employer.”).
17
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Clause would be violated.19 And, depending on the level to which the
government investigated and made judgements about a religious
institution’s teachings or ideologies, both the procedural 20 and
substantive21 entanglement proscriptions of the Establishment Clause
would be violated.
Important to an understanding of the operation of the
ministerial exception is an understanding of the different claims
available under both Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities
Act. In general, the Seventh Circuit treats the ADA cause of action for
employment discrimination in the same way it treats Title VII.22 To
successfully plead a wrongful termination based on a protected
characteristic of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that his or her
employer discharged the employee because of the employee’s “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”23 This protection was extended
to sexual orientation in Bostock v. Clayton County.24
In contrast to the wrongful termination claim, to succeed on a
hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove four elements:
“(1) unwelcome harassment; (2) based on a protected characteristic;
(3) that was so pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and
create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) a basis for
employer liability.”25 While the two claims are different, the analysis
still is conducted under a theory of liability predicated on the
19

Id. at 184 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from
appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with
the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”).
20 See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 982–83.
21 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182–83.
22 See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 977.
23 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“[I]t is ‘unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.’” quoting 42 U.S.C. § 20000e-2(a)(1) (1991)).
24 Id. at 1754.
25 Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 977, citing Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 989
F.3d 587, 600 (7th Cir. 2021).
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employment relationship between, for instance, a religious institution
and that religious institution’s ministers. 26
It seems from the Supreme Court cases concerning the
ministerial exception in the Title VII wrongful termination context that
the phrase which invites the Religion Clause issue in wrongful
termination suits is “because of.”27 The Seventh Circuit appears to
believe that the companion issue in hostile work environment claims is
the third element concerning the “alter[ing of ] the conditions of
employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment” as a
result of the “unwelcome harassment [ ] based on a protected
characteristic.”28 As for the ADA, the Seventh Circuit has assumed
that employment claims operate in much the same way under the ADA
as they do in the Title VII context. 29
Having established the nature of employment claims, the trump
to such claims in the context of a minister suing a religious institution
is the ministerial exception. The ministerial exception is a
Constitutional bulwark that protects the First Amendment rights of
religious employers in the face of federal employment legislation by
generally immunizing them from suit. 30 In expanding the Title VII
definition of “sex” to include sexual orientation and transgender rights
in Bostock versus Clayton County, Georgia, the Supreme Court noted
that the ministerial exception is one way that “the First Amendment
can bar the application of employment discrimination laws ‘to claims

26

See id. at 977–78 (Section B concerns the analysis of employment claims).
42 U.S.C. § 2000, et. seq; see also Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at
2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“When it applies, the [ministerial] exception is
extraordinarily potent: It gives an employer free rein to discriminate because of race,
sex, pregnancy, age, disability, or other traits protected by law when selecting or
firing their “ministers,” even when the discrimination is wholly unrelated to the
employer's religious beliefs or practices [citation omitted].”).
28 See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 977, citing Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
989 F.3d 587, 600 (7th Cir. 2021).
29 See id.
30 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171, 188–90 (2012) (discussing the Free Exercise Clause).
27
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concerning the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.’”31
The ministerial exception as it is understood at the time of
Demkovich has not existed in Supreme Court jurisprudence all that
long.32 To avoid offending either of the Religion Clauses when a
religious institution is sued by one of its ministers, every U.S. Court of
Appeals has implemented a version of the ministerial exception to bar
suits by ministers against churches that concern tangible employment
actions,33 with the first case describing the ministerial exception
coming out of the Fifth Circuit in 1972. 34 While every circuit of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals had eventually recognized the ministerial
exception,35 the U.S. Supreme Court in 2012 acknowledged and
endorsed it in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. E.E.O.C.36 and later expanded it in Our Lady of Guadeloupe
v. Morrissey-Berru in 2020.37 However, even though the Court
promulgated a uniform standard for the ministerial exception, U.S.
Courts of Appeals have quibbled about scope of the ministerial
exception.38 Some, including the Seventh Circuit, have broadened the

31

Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) quoting
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
32 The Supreme Court first recognized the ministerial exception in 2012 in the
Hosanna-Tabor opinion. 565 U.S. at 188 (“We agree [with the Courts of Appeals]
that there is such a ministerial exception.”).
33 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 n.2 (collecting cases).
34 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
35 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 n.2 (collecting cases).
36 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
37 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
38 Compare Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238,
1243–46 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding ministerial exception categorically applies to
hostile work environment claims) with Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of
Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945–50 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding ministerial exception does not
apply categorically to hostile work environment claims).
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ministerial exception to include claims not originally swept under the
hiring and firing scope established by Hosanna-Tabor.39
This Part first will explore two U.S. Supreme Court cases
bearing directly on the ministerial exception. First up for analysis is
Hosanna-Tabor, which officially recognized the ministerial
exception,40 and second is Our Lady of Guadalupe, which
significantly expanded the sweep of the exception by expanding the
definition of who qualifies as a “minister.” 41 Next, this Part will
explore the three justifications of the ministerial exception: first, the
history of religious rights in the founding period, and second, the twin
threads of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
The Current Formulation of the Ministerial Exception
As it stands today, the Supreme Court has noted that the
ministerial exception categorically bars workplace discrimination suits
related to hiring and firing brought by ministers against their religious
employers.42 In Hosanna-Tabor,43 Chief Justice Roberts, speaking for
the unanimous court, explicitly noted that even though the two
Religious Clauses “‘often exert conflicting pressures’ . . . [b]oth
Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the
decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”44
The conflict in Hosanna-Tabor centered on the decision by the
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School to fire one of
its employees, Cheryl Perich.45 Ms. Perich was a teacher in the
39

Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 984 (holding ministerial exception categorically
applies to hostile work environment claims).
40 See comment, supra, at note 32.
41 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069
(2020)
42
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.
171, 196 (2012)
43 Id. at 188.
44 Id. at 180 (2012) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005)).
45 Id. at 178–79.
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church’s associated parochial school.46 More importantly, she was a
“called” teacher: in the Hosanna-Tabor school, teachers were divided
into two categories: “called” and “lay.”47 Called teachers were given
the title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” 48 Lay teachers, on the
other hand, did not have this added religious distinction.49 While the
two types of teachers taught substantially the same secular material,
called teachers were prioritized in the school’s hiring.50 Called
teachers and lay teachers both led their students in religious activities.
For example, Ms. Perich brought her students to chapel, which she led
twice a year; she taught religion classes four days a week; and she led
her students in prayer and other “devotional exercises” daily. 51
Ms. Perich developed narcolepsy and took a disability leave. 52
Upon her attempted return, however, the school effectively fired her
by eliminating her position, and the congregation voted to offer her a
“peaceful release” from her “call.” 53 Ms. Perich refused the peaceful
release and instead brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 54 The
church claimed a religious exemption in asserting the ministerial
exception: notably, “[a]ccording to the Church, Perich was a minister,
and she had been fired for a religious reason—namely, that her threat
to sue the Church violated the Synod’s belief that Christians should
resolve their disputes internally.”55
The crux of the issue, as the Court interpreted it, was whether
requiring a religious institution to hire or fire a minister would run

46

Id.
Id.
48 Id. at 177.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51
Id. at 177.
52 Id. at 178–79.
53 Id. at 178.
54 Id. at 179–80.
55 Id. at 180.
47
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afoul of either the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. 56
The Court answered yes: “[s]uch action interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.” 57
First, forcing a religious institution to hire or fire a minister, or
punishing a church who fails to comply with a court order to that
effect, would violate the Free Exercise clause by infringing on the
church’s Constitutional right to “shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments.”58 Second, forcing a church to hire or fire
its ministers would also violate the Establishment Clause because
“determin[ing] which individuals will minister” is the prerogative of
the religious organization59; the Establishment Clause “prohibits
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”60
Applying the ministerial exception to Hosanna-Tabor, the
Court held that Ms. Perich could not bring suit against the church for
her termination.61 The Court focused on four main criteria in
determining that Ms. Perich was a minister62 and ultimately held that
she was; therefore, the church could invoke the ministerial
exception.63 In adopting the ministerial exception for religious
ministers, the Court explicitly noted that it had not yet recognized the

56

Id. at 179–80
Id. at 188
58 Id.
59 Id. at 189.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 190.
62 Id. at 191–92. First, the church held Ms. Perich “out as a minister, with a
role distinct from that of most of its members.” Id. at 191. Second, “her title as a
minister reflected a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal
process of commissioning.” Id. Third, she “held herself out as a minister of the
Church by accepting the formal call to religious service, according to its terms.” Id.
Fourth, her “job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and
carrying out its mission.” Id. at 192.
63 Id. at 190.
57
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ministerial exception for employment discrimination claims, but
acknowledged the tradition in the courts of appeals. 64
As of the holding in Hosanna-Tabor, the ministerial exception
only applied to suits concerning the hiring or firing of “ministers” by
their religious institutions.65 The Court later clarified and expanded
those four factors in Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru, in
which the Court opted for a broader interpretation of the word
“minister.”66
In fact, Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru is only the
second case the Supreme Court has decided with respect to the
ministerial exception.67 In 2020, the Court held that Ms. MorrisseyBerru, a school teacher in a Catholic school, was a minister 68 and
therefore her federal age discrimination claims against the Catholic
school she worked for could not proceed under the ministerial
exception.69 Both Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe
involved schoolteachers in religious schools that were held to be
ministers.70 The difference between them, though, is the level to which
the teachers were involved in religious instruction. 71 In HosannaTabor, the teacher was a “called” teacher and was given instruction in
64

“Until today, we have not had occasion to consider whether this freedom of
a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging
discrimination in employment. The Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have had
extensive experience with this issue. Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [citation], and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts
of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,”
grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to
claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and
its ministers.” Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
65 See id.
66 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2065–69
(2020).
67 See id. at 2055.
68
Id. at 2066.
69 Id. at 2069.
70 See id. at 2056; see also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178.
71 Compare Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2056, with Hosanna-Tabor,
565 U.S. at 178.
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religious pedagogy.72 In the case of Our Lady, the teacher was not
labeled a “minister” nor did she hold herself out as a minister. 73
Further, she had limited religious training. 74 The Court, speaking
through Justice Alito, held that she was a minister nonetheless.75 The
Court used the same rubric of the Religion Clauses to determine that,
even though the teacher was slightly removed from the position in
Hosanna-Tabor, the church still “expressly saw [her] as playing a vital
part in carrying out the mission of the church.”76 Rather than focus on
titles of employees, the Court focused on what the employee actually
does.77 Because Ms. Morrissey-Berru taught some religion classes as
part of her role as teacher, she was therefore a minister for purposes of
the ministerial exception because she “performed vital religious
duties” through her “[e]ducating and forming students in the Catholic
faith.”78
The takeaway from Our Lady of Guadalupe is the expansion of
the scope of which employees qualify as “ministers.” 79 Courts have
generally held that music directors, 80 as well as teachers81 and youth

72 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 177. (“The Synod classifies teachers into
two categories: “called” and “lay.” “Called” teachers are regarded as having been
called to their vocation by God through a congregation. To be eligible to receive a
call from a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain academic requirements . . .
“Lay” or “contract” teachers, by contrast, are not required to be trained by the Synod
or even to be Lutheran.”).
73 Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2058.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2066.
76 Id.
77 Justice Alito specifically noted that in determining whether a religious
employee is a ministerial one, “[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an employee
does.” Id. at 2064.
78 Id. at 2064, 2066.
79 Id. at 2069; see also Thomas Johnson II & Tanya Warnke, The U.S. Supreme
Court Expands the Ministerial Exception, JDSUPRA (July 15, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the–u–s–supreme–court–expands–the–96963/.
80 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d,
795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000).
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group leaders 82 in religious institutions, are ministers. However,
employees are not designated “ministers” merely by their
employment in a religious institution: courts have held that
secretarial staff83 and janitorial staff84 who are not central to the
“spiritual and pastoral mission” of the religious institution 85 of
religion are not ministers for the purpose of the ministerial exception.
Historical Justification of the Ministerial Exception
Both modern Supreme Court decisions which concern the
ministerial exception, Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe,
extensively recount the history of the Religion Clauses to explain how
the ministerial exception furthers the purpose of the First
Amendment.86 Further, other historical events surrounding the
ratification of the Bill of Rights helped the Court contextualize the
broad deference that the federal government has given to ecclesiastical
decision makers.87 Those decision makers are afforded great latitude
to decide matters of ecclesiastical concern, both concerning matters of
81

See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2069; Hosanna-Tabor, 565
U.S. at 196.
82 Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 835 (6th
Cir. 2015).
83 E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982)
(“We conclude simply that [the plaintiff’s] position, even during the period of her
broadest duties, did not fulfill the function of a minister, nor was her employment at
[the religious press] the type of critically sensitive position within the church that
McClure sought to protect.”).
84 Davis v. Balt. Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710 (D. Md.
2013) (“In this case, even though [synagogue] is a religious institution, it is plain that
the Plaintiff is not one of its ministers.”).
85 See id. at 710, quoting Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d
at 801.
86 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171, 186–86 (2012) (explaining history of religion clauses); Our Lady of
Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2061–63 (2020)
(same).
87 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182–88.
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internal church governance and the selection and appointment of the
churches’ ministers. In addition, both decisions utilize the Court’s
Religion Clause jurisprudence to justify the broad contours of the
ministerial exception.88
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor recounted three main historical
backdrops against which the Religion Clauses were formed. 89 First,
Chief Justice Roberts discusses the relationship between Puritans and
the English Crown which led the Puritans to come to the new
American continent.90 The English Crown had previously instated
laws such as the Uniformity Act of 1662 which “limited service as a
minister to those who formally assented to prescribed tenets and
pledged to follow the mode of worship set forth in the Book of
Common Prayer. Any minister who refused to make that pledge was
‘deprived of all his Spiritual Promotions.’”91 The Court noted that the
Puritans fled this nationally controlled church to establish a Quaker
colony that enjoyed independence from the Church of England. 92
The second vignette focused on the Southern colonists during the
days of the Church of England. 93 The colonists desired to install their
own ministers, while the Crown insisted that the Bishop of London
was the only official that could appoint ministers in the Colonies.94
Third, the Court focused on the landscape at the adoption of the First
Amendment.95 The evil which the Founding Generation sought to
combat was the “possibility of a national church.” 96 As Chief Justice
John Roberts noted, “By forbidding the ‘establishment of religion’ and
guaranteeing the ‘free exercise thereof,’ the Religion Clauses ensured

88

See id; Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2061–62.
See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182–85.
90 Id. at 182.
91 Id., citing Act of Uniformity, 1662, 14 Car. 2, ch.4.
92
Id. at 182
93 Id. at 183
94 Id.
95 Id. at 183–184.
96 Id. at 183
89
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that the new Federal Government—unlike the English Crown—would
have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices.” 97
It is with this background that the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment were ratified. 98 Percolating among the Founding
Generation was the abhorrence of the idea that the government should
get involved with matters of church and state—particularly those
matters which concerned the very autonomy of the church to shape its
beliefs, like the appointment of ministers. Next, this Part will analyze
the twin foundations of the ministerial exception: the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause.
Free Exercise Clause Justification of the Ministerial Exception
Both Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe relied heavily
on the Free Exercise Clause to justify the Court’s reluctance to
interfere with the ministerial relationship. 99 The Free Exercise Clause
states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the exercise thereof.”100 The ministerial
exception can therefore be viewed as a bulwark against governmental
intrusion into the ability of religious institutions to choose their own
ministers.101 This theory of the ministerial exception as a bulwark
prevails through much of the U.S. Courts of Appeals’102 and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 103 The ability of a religious institution

97Id.
98

E.g., id.
Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2067–69.; Id. at 188.
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I. cl. i–ii.
101 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–90 (discussing the Free Exercise
Clause).
102 E.g., Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968,
985 (7th Cir. 2021).
103 See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S.
at 188.
99
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to decide who ministers to its faithful is just as important as the right
to decide what a religious institution believes. 104
Both modern Supreme Court decisions 105 make reference to
other earlier cases concerning the “general principle of church
autonomy,” which includes “independence in matters of faith and
doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government.” 106
First, the Court cites Watson v. Jones.107 The Court declined to decide
a dispute between two factions of a church over a parcel of property:
the Court noted in Watson, and reaffirmed in Hosanna-Tabor, that
“whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decision as final, and as binding on them.” 108
In addition, the Court cites Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in North America 109 as standing for the
principle that matters of ecclesiastical governance are protected by the
Free Exercise Clause.110 In Kedroff, the Court held a New York State
statute unconstitutional because the statute interfered with the ability
104

C.f. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89 (“Requiring a church to accept or
retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon
more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those
who will personify its beliefs.”).
105 See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060; id. at 188.
106 The Court originally discussed these three cases in tandem in HosannaTabor. 565 U.S. at 185–88. The Court again mentioned these three cases in its
discussion of Our Lady of Guadalupe. 140 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing Hosanna-Tabor,
565 U.S. at 185–88).
107 80 U.S. 679 (1872); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2061.
108 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185–86 quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.
109 344 U.S. 94 (1952); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2061
110 “Confronting the issue [of internal church governance] under the
Constitution for the first time in Kedroff, the Court recognized that the [f]reedom to
select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,’ is ‘part of the
free exercise of religion’ protected by the First Amendment against government
interreference.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185–87, quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at
116.
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of the Russian Orthodox church to dictate who would use its cathedral
in New York.111 Finally, the Court cited Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, which the
Court noting that the First Amendment allows religious institutions to
organize their own rules and to adjudicate those rules themselves—
with the understanding that federal or state courts will not encroach on
their decision-making.112
Synthesizing the court’s analysis, one major thrust of the
ministerial exception flows from the Free Exercise right of religious
institutions to determine their own faith and beliefs. The ministerial
relationship, then, is an extension of a church’s ability to choose which
ministers they hire or fire. Logically, this makes sense: a church
would not truly be independent of governmental reach if a minister
could be forcibly reinstated by a court order.
Using the Court’s analysis of early Free Exercise
jurisprudence, it is clear that the upshot is that religious institutions
have the ultimate ability to decide their beliefs, 113 how they exercise
those beliefs,114 and who should espouse those beliefs to a religious
institutions’ followers.115 In parallel cases involving the Free Exercise
clause, it is clear just how broad this protected zone is: generally, the
ability to regulate a religious institution’s internal religious activities is
close to zero. However, with respect to the ministerial exception, the
line will ultimately be drawn by the actual nature of internal religious
decisions: for example, the ministerial exception does not apply to
non-ministers because the terms of their employment are divorced
from religious beliefs themselves. 116
111

Id. at 186–87, quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115, 119.
Id. at 186–87, citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of America &
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696.
113 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89.
114 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
524 (1993).
115 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89.
116 Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 988 (“Defendants and all members of this court agree
that employment discrimination laws may be enforced against churches on behalf
of non–ministerial employees. Those employees may assert rights against churches
112
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Establishment Clause Justification for the Ministerial Exception
Another justification for the ministerial exception is the
Establishment Clause, which notes that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”117 The Supreme Court has
noted two ways that the Establishment Clause would be violated if the
ministerial exception did not bar suits employment discrimination by
ministers against their religious institution employers.118 First,
procedural entanglement: if courts were to encourage endless litigation
and inquiry into a religious institution’s actions, it could
impermissibly chill the ability of the religious institution to practice its
beliefs.119 Second, substantive entanglement: if courts were to analyze
issues of church belief, or allow those beliefs to be placed in front of a
jury, the court would be passing judgment on the beliefs of a religious
institution and thereby “establish[ing]” a court–approved view of
religion.120 Further, substantive entanglement could be present if the
government appoints its own ministers or disapproves the appointment
of other ministers.121
This Part established the two (or three, if one counts procedural
and substantive entanglement concerns as two separate) threads that
flow through the en banc opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Demkovich
v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, Calumet City.122 Part II will describe

for discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, and every other aspect of the
employment relationship, including hostile environment claims.”) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
117 U.S. CONST. Amend. I
118 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–16 (1971) (third prong of
lemon test being entanglement); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970) (entanglement concerns).
119
See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 982–83.
120 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.
171, 188–89 (2012).
121 Id. at 182–83.
122 Demkovich, 3 F.4th 968.
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the winding procedural journey of the case, from the District Court123
for the Northern District of Illinois to the en banc Seventh Circuit, 124
with attention paid to the courts’ analysis of the religious freedom
threads established in Part I.
PART II
DEMKOVICH V. ST. ANDREW THE APOSTLE PARISH
The procedural road to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was winding: the case rolled through two U.S. District Court
opinions, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit, and was
ultimately dismissed entirely by the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc.
This Part will explore each level of appeal of in detail; nowhere better
can the threads of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause be analyzed than in the courts’ own words.
The Facts of Demkovich
Mr. Sandor Demkovich was hired as the choir director, music
director, and organist of St. Andrew the Apostle Catholic church in
Calumet City, Illinois in September 2012. 125 In his role, Mr.
Demkovich was responsible—subject to the ultimate approval of the
head pastor, Reverend Jacek Dada126—for choosing the liturgical
music to be played during the celebration of the mass.127 Mr.

123

Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 2017 WL
4339817 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2018).
124 Demkovich, 3 F.4th 968.
125

Complaint at ¶¶ 8–9, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City,
343 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018) (No. 19–2142). The procedural
posture limited the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc to the
facts as alleged in the original Complaint filed by Mr. Demkovich. Demkovich, 3
F.4th at 974–75.
126 Id. ¶ 10.
127 Id.
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Demkovich is a gay man and has both diabetes and a metabolic
disorder.128
Mr. Demkovich experienced harassment due to his sexuality
and his bodily appearance during his employment at the Church. 129 As
his wedding to his husband approached, Mr. Demkovich alleged that
he was the subject of “sex- and sexual orientation animus,”130
including the reference by Reverend Dada calling him and his partner
of fourteen years “bitches.”131 One day, as the wedding approached,
Reverend Dada asked Demkovich if he and his partner had plans to be
married.132
As the date of his marriage approached, Demkovich allegedly
experienced “increasingly hostile” behavior, 133 including the reference
to the marriage ceremony as a “fag wedding.”134 Dada encouraged
other individuals in the parish to confront Demkovich about his
upcoming wedding.135 Demkovich heard rumors that his position at
the parish would be terminated due to his wedding. 136 Finally, the
marriage took place on September 19, 2014, 137 and Reverend Dada
asked for his resignation on September 22, 2014. 138 When Demkovich
twice refused to resign, Dada fired him. 139 Dada reasoned that his
firing was because Demkovich’s “union is against the teachings of the
Catholic church.”140

128

Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
130 Id. ¶ 16.
131 Id.
132 Id. ¶ 17.
133 Id. ¶ 18.
134 Id. ¶ 22.
135 Id. ¶¶ 19, 20, 23, 24.
136
Id. ¶¶ 25, 26.
137 Id. ¶ 27.
138 Id. ¶ 28.
139 Id. ¶ 33.
140 Id.
129
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In addition to the harassment about his sexual orientation and
marital status, Demkovich also experienced harassment about his
weight and disabilities. 141 For example, Reverend Dada would ask
Demkovich to walk Dada’s dog so he could, in the words of the
complaint, “get some exercise in an effort to lose some weight.” 142
Other types of comments noted in the complaint included Dada noting
that Demkovich should lose weight so that Dada would not need to
preside over Demkovich’s funeral and that it was “cost prohibitive” to
keep Demkovich on the Parish’s health insurance plan due to
Demkovich’s weight and diabetes. 143
District Court Proceedings
After his termination, Mr. Demkovich brought suit against both
St. Andrew’s Parish and the Archdiocese of Chicago,144 the diocese of
which St. Andrew’s is a part. 145 Judge Edmond Chang of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois dismissed all counts
of the first complaint without prejudice upon a motion by the
Archdiocese.146 Demkovich then amended and refiled the
complaint147; the Archdiocese again filed a motion to dismiss, which

141

Id. ¶ 35.
Id.
143 Id. ¶ 37.
144 Demkovich also properly sought, and was granted, a “Right to Sue” letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This letter gave Demkovich
authorization to proceed with his suit in the U.S. District Court. Id. ¶ 3; see also
Exhibit A, id. (exhibit containing E.E.O.C. right to sue letter in which E.E.O.C.
declined to make any legal conclusions about the Diocese’s compliance with the
statute).
145 See id. ¶ 6.
146 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 2017 WL
4339817 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2018).
147 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City, 343 F. Supp. 3d
772, 775–77 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018).
142
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the court granted with respect to the marital, sexual orientation, and
sex claims, but denied with respect to the disability claims.148
Round 1: Dismissed Without Prejudice
In his first complaint, Mr. Demkovich alleged employment
discrimination on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status under
Title VII,149 the Illinois Human Rights Act, 150 and the Cook County
Human Rights Ordinance. 151 He also alleged employment
discrimination based on disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act152 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. 153 Specifically,
he alleged employment discrimination claims based on his
termination.154
This first complaint was dismissed on all counts by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 155 pursuant to the
church’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).156 The church argued in its motion
to dismiss that the ministerial exception applied because Demkovich
performed “ministerial” duties as music director. Judge Edmond E.
Chang held that Demkovich was a minister. 157 And, because
148

Id. at 789.
Demkovich, 2017 WL 4339817, * 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2018); see also Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et. seq (1991).
150 Demkovich, 2017 WL 4339817, * 1; see also Illinois Human Rights Act,
775 I.L.C.S. 5/2, et. seq.
151 Demkovich, 2017 WL 4339817, * 1; see also Cook County Human Rights
Ordinance, Sec. 42–30.
152 Demkovich, 2017 WL 4339817, * 1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et. seq
(2021).
153 Demkovich, 2017 WL 4339817, * 1; see also Illinois Human Rights Act,
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–102 (2020) et seq.
154
Demkovich, 2017 WL 4339817, **1–2.
155 Id.
156 Id. * 1; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).
157 Id. * 3 (“the Court holds that Demkovich was a minister for the purposes of
the ministerial exception”). Judge Chang’s first memorandum opinion and order was
149
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Demkovich himself had alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the definition
of “minister,”158 the ministerial exception applied. 159 The court
dismissed all the claims, including the state and local ones.160 Because
Demkovich had not yet amended his complaint, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), the court noted that the dismissal was
without prejudice and therefore he could amend and refile the
complaint.161
Round 2: The Amended Complaint
Demkovich amended and refiled his complaint.162 The second
complaint repackaged all of the same information of the first
complaint.163 But, rather than alleging employment discrimination
the only point at which the issue was raised of whether Demkovich was a “minister”
within the meaning of both the Seventh Circuit’s definition of minister, AliceaHernadez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003), and within
the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of minister. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012). Our Lady of
Guadalupe had not yet been decided—the District Court opinion came down in 2017
whereas Our Lady of Guadalupe was decided in 2020. 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
158 Id. * 5 (“Here, the applicability of the exception is ready for decision
because, by stating in his complaint that he selected the music for each mass,
Demkovich has presented all the facts necessary to decide the ministerial exception
without discovery.”).
159 Id. at * 6.
160 Id. at * 6 (“It is appropriate for this Court to dismiss [the local, state, and
federal claims] because as a matter of federal constitutional law—not state law—the
Archdiocese cannot be held liable for a firing in an employment discrimination case
brought by their minister.”) (emphasis in original).
161 Id. at * 7 (“[T]he Court is skeptical that the allegation that prompted the
ministerial exception’s application can be fixed, but Rule 15(a) does generally
require one shot at amendment.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a).
162 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, 343 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D.
Ill. 2018).
163 Id. at 776–77 (“Demkovich then filed an amended complaint, alleging
much of the same discriminatory conduct, but modifying his claims to challenge the
hostile work environment, rather than the firing itself.”). The complaint did, in
addition to changing from termination–related to workplace environment–related
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based on his termination, Demkovich brought claims of employment
discrimination based on the hostile work environment at the Parish. 164
Accordingly, rather than requesting reinstatement as he had in the first
complaint,165 Demkovich’s requested pecuniary remedies flowed only
from his time of employment: he requested monetary damages for the
pain and suffering from the “discriminatory insults and remarks” he
endured during his employment. 166
The Church again filed a motion to dismiss both the Title VII
claims and the ADA claims on the basis that the ministerial exception
rendered the claims constitutionally infirm. 167 Interestingly, Judge
Chang allowed the claims relating to disability discrimination to go
forward while at the same time he dismissed the claims relating to
discrimination on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status claims. 168
The District Court reasoned that the ministerial exception was
not a categorical bar on workplace discrimination claims brought by
ministers against ministers, but rather the ministerial exception must
be applied on a case-by-case basis.169 By applying Hosanna-Tabor
outright, the District Court noted that because Demkovich was a
minister, he could not bring suit on the theory of his firing due to the
claims, changed the requested remedies from reinstatement and backpay to damages
for emotional harm and suffering. Id. at 777.
164 Id.
165 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 2017 WL
4339817, * 2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2018)
166 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City, 343 F. Supp. 3d
772, 776 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3
F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. (“[T]he Court first holds that the ministerial exception does not
categorically bar hostile work environment claims that do not seek relief for a
tangible employment action. Instead, those types of claims (like the one presented
here) must be evaluated on a case–by–case basis for excessive intrusion on the
religious institution's First Amendment rights. Based on that analysis, the
Archdiocese's motion is granted on the claims based on sex, sexual orientation, and
marital status, but denied on the disability claims.”).

236

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/9

24

White: Workplace Harassment Suits by Ministers against Religious Institu

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

implications of ecclesiastical control. However, the court noted that
Hosanna-Tabor was not concerned with non-tangible employment
actions, e.g. a hostile work environment. The District Court pointed to
the language in Hosanna-Tabor explaining that the exception “ensures
that the authority to select and control who will minister to the
faithful—a matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church’s alone.”170
But, in the reasoning of the District Court, the Supreme Court left the
door open to analyze hostile work environment claims before
determining whether the ministerial exception should apply. 171
Before reaching the substance of the ministerial exception
affirmative defense, the District Court first summarily dealt with a
Seventh Circuit case that the Church argued precluded Demkovich’s
claims. The Church argued that in Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit had already held that ministers
could not bring any employment action claims against a church. 172
However, to the District Court, “[t]hat [was] an overbroad reading of
the opinion.”173 The court noted that the application of the ministerial
exception to intangible employment action claims brought by
ministers against churches remained an “open question” in the
circuit.174 Ultimately, the District Court decided that if a minister
brings a hostile work environment claim that “does not challenge a
tangible employment action and does not pose excessive entanglement
with the religious employer, then the ministerial exception should not
apply.”175
Under this rubric, the court granted the motion to dismiss the
claims concerning Mr. Demkovich’s sex, sexual orientation, and
170

Id. at 778 quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012) (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).
171 Id. at 778–89.
172 Id. at 779 (“The Archdiocese contends that in Alicea–Hernandez v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit
held that any claim brought by a minister against a church is barred by the
ministerial exception.”).
173 Id. at 779.
174 Id. at 781.
175 Id. at 785.
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marital status claims, 176 but did not dismiss the claims concerning Mr.
Demkovich’s disability.177 First, with respect to the hostile
environment claims, the court held that litigating the claims would
“excessively entangle the government in religion.” 178 The church
offered a religious justification for the derogatory remarks: “they
‘reflect the pastor’s opposition, in accord with Catholic doctrine, to
same sex marriage.’”179 It therefore noted that the inquiry must stop
there in accordance with the demands of First Amendment. 180 The
court also noted a few other entanglement concerns, including the
procedural entanglement attending the long discovery period and the
concern that the same–sex marriage issue would be litigated in other
ways throughout the case—including the motive Reverend Dada
possessed when he made the remarks and the amount to which he
subscribed to the church’s teaching. All of these concerns led the
court to dismiss the claims relating to Mr. Demkovich’s sex, sexual
orientation, and marital claims.181
But, with respect to the disability claims, 182 the court held that
the First Amendment did not bar Mr. Demkovich’s claims. The
church did not offer a religious explanation for the comments directed
at Mr. Demkovich’s weight—rather, the church argued that Reverend
Dada’s comments concerning Mr. Demkovich’s weight “reflect[ed]
176

Id. at 786–87.
Id. at 787–89.
178 Id. at 786.
179
Id. (citation to litigation document omitted).
180 Id. at 786 (“This official opposition weighs as an excessive–entanglement
concern in this case, because the harassing statements and conduct are motivated by
an official Church position (or at least the Archdiocese would defend the case on
those grounds). Of course, regulating how the official opposition is expressed is not
as directly intrusive as outright punishing the Church for holding that position
(which a federal court cannot do). But it comes close, and must weigh in favor of
barring the claim under the Religion Clauses.”) (citations omitted).
181 Id. at 787.
182 The District Court noted that courts in the Seventh Circuit assume that the
Americans with Disabilities Act permits hostile work environment claims. Id. at 787,
citing Shott v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 652 Fed. Appx. 455, 458 (7th Cir. 2016).
177
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the pastor’s subjective views and/or evaluation of [Mr. Demkovich’s]
fitness for his position as a minister.”183 Because the disability claim
did not implicate religious justification and therefore would not
entangle the court with religious doctrines, the court allowed the
disability hostile work environment claims to proceed.184
Panel of the Seventh Circuit
With the permission of the District Court, the church filed an
interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit, certifying an answer to the
question: “Under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
does the ministerial exception ban all claims of a hostile work
environment brought by a plaintiff who qualifies as a minister, even if
the claim does not challenge a tangible employment action?”185 A
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit, comprised of Judges Flaum,
Rovner, and Hamilton,186 answered the question in the negative and
reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the sex, sexual orientation,
and marital hostile work environment claims. 187 Judge Hamilton
authored and was joined in the majority opinion by Judge Rovner;
Judge Flaum filed a dissenting opinion. 188
The majority judges traced similar steps as the District Court
judges. After reviewing Hosanna-Tabor, the court aligned the
question presented with the aims of the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. As stated in Hosanna and restated by Judge
Hamilton, “[b]y imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the
Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape

183

Id. at 788, citing Defendant’s Reply Brief at ¶ 5.
See id. at 788.
185 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City, 793 F.3d 718 (7th
Cir. 2020) reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020), on reh’g en banc,
3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
186 Id. at 719.
187 Id. at 720–21.
188 Id. at 719–20, 736.
184
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its own faith and mission through its appointments.”189 And,
“[a]ccording the state the power to determine which individuals will
minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.” 190
Ultimately, the three-judge panel held that the ministerial exception
did not apply at all: Mr. Demkovich could bring his disability claim
and his sex and sexual orientation claims.191
Seventh Circuit Sitting En Banc
After the decision of the three-judge panel, the church sought a
rehearing en banc.192 The court granted the rehearing and ultimately
vacated the three-judge panel opinion.193 At the end of the day, the
Seventh Circuit sitting en banc held that the ministerial exception
categorically applies to hostile work environment claims brought by
ministers against their religious employers. 194 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit sitting en banc instructed the lower court to dismiss all of Mr.
Demkovich’s hostile work environment claims, including the sex,
sexual orientation, and marital status claims as well as the disability
claim.195
189

Id. at 722 citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012)
190 Id. at 722, quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89.
191 Id. at 735–36.
192
Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968,
974–75 (7th Cir. 2021).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 985 (“The First Amendment ministerial exception protects a religious
organization's employment relationship with its ministers, from hiring to firing and
the supervising in between. Adjudicating a minister's hostile work environment
claims based on interaction between ministers would undermine this constitutionally
protected relationship. It would also result in civil intrusion upon, and excessive
entanglement with, the religious realm, departing from the teachings of HosannaTabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe. Therefore, the ministerial exception precludes
Demkovich's hostile work environment claims against the church.”)
195 Id. at 985.
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To reach its conclusion that the ministerial exception
categorically bars hostile work environment claims in the same way it
does tangible employment actions including hiring and firing, the
majority opinion pulled on the threads outlined by the Supreme Court
in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady.196 The court stated two “principles”
gleaned from the two guiding Supreme Court cases: first, though the
cases were centered on termination, the rationale of the two guiding
cases is not limited to termination—rather, the rationale relates to the
“entire employment relationship, including hiring, firing, and
supervising in between.”197 Second, the court noted “we cannot lose
sight of the harms—civil intrusion and excessive entanglement—that
the ministerial exception prevents.”198
The focus of the court on the relationship between two
ministers boiled down to parts A and B.199 The court held that
adjudicating that relationship would, first, intrude on the church’s
“constitutionally protected relationship with its ministers,” 200 and
second, “cause civil intrusion into, and excessive entanglement with,
the religious sphere.”201
Ministerial Exception through Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of
Guadalupe
Much of the court’s opinion with respect to the relationship
between ministers focused on differentiating the role and workplace
environment of ministers from non–ministers.202 The court noted that
196

See id. at 975–78.
Id. at 976–77, citing Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060–61 [the
court uses id. here but is unclear where the page is]; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
194–96.
198 Id. at 977 citing Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060–61; HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 187–89.
199
See id. at 977–83 (Parts A and B, respectively. Part C discusses other
applications of the ministerial exception within the Seventh Circuit.
200 See id. at 978.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 978.
197
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if Mr. Demkovich’s challenge succeeded, the court would be saying
that his working conditions in the “ministerial work environment
‘were so pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions of
[his] employment were altered.”203 This pronouncement, the court
said, would run counter to the purpose of the ministerial exception as
outlined in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe.204 The
ministerial relationship, because of its religious nature, is different
than other types of employment relationships. 205 Because the religious
liberty right at stake is the right of the church to determine which
ministers preach its beliefs, so follows the right to control how those
ministers preach its beliefs.206 And, because “ministers and
nonministers are different in kind, the First Amendment requires that
their hostile work environment claims be treated differently.” 207
Ultimately, the court differentiates in multiple ways ministerial
employees from non–ministerial employees. The ultimate takeaway
for the court with respect to intruding on an ecclesiastical sphere is
that “to render a legal judgment about Demkovich’s work environment
is to render a religious judgment about how ministers interact.” 208
Further, in distinguishing itself from the dissent, the court noted that it
is not condoning harassment in religious contexts.209 Rather, the entire
point of the ministerial exception is to preclude the intrusion of the
government into a religious sphere that comes with deciding where
ministerial supervision turns into ministerial harassment. 210
According to the majority, its formulation of a ministerial
exception that categorically bars hostile work environment claims fits
203

See id. quoting Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 (2013).
See id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id. The court also referenced the uniquely religious nature of Mr.
Demkovich’s employment: in no other context, the court says, would Mr.
Demkovich be required to play the organ or assist in the celebration of the Mass.
Only a religious employer could institute that type of work requirement. Id.
208 Id. at 979, citing McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2013).
209 Id.
210 Id.
204
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within the framework of Our Lady of Guadalupe because the
supervision of a church’s ministers “is as much a ‘component’ of its
autonomy as ‘is the selection of the individuals who play certain key
roles.’”211 Importantly, the court noted that its conception of the
ministerial exception protects a religious institution’s right to select
and control its ministers from the beginning, middle and end. “It
would be incongruous if the independence of religious organizations
mattered only at the beginning (hiring) and the end (firing) of the
ministerial relationship, and not in between (work environment).” 212
Finally, with respect to the church autonomy issue, the court
underscored the Supreme Court’s holding in Hosanna-Tabor: the
purpose of the ministerial exception does not just insulate churches
from religiously motivated conduct, but rather it is concerned with
reducing the government’s involvement with “internal church
decision[s] that affect[ ] the faith and mission of the church itself.” 213
Therefore, a religious organization should not and does not need to
give religious justification for its termination claims for those claims
to be barred under the ministerial exception—and the same is true, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned, for hostile work environment claims. 214
After its discussion of the importance of allowing the internal
self-governance of the church, the court then moved to an analysis of
the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause entanglement
concerns endemic in the scrutiny of hostile work environment claims
in the ministerial context. 215
Free Exercise Clause

211

Id. at 989, quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
Id. citing Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (relying on the
Supreme Court’s use of the word “supervise” in addition to select and remove
ministers “without interference by secular authorities”); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
194–95 (focusing on the word “select and control”) (emphasis added by court).
213 Id. at 980 quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
214 Id.
215 See id.
212
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The court restated the “litany”216 of Free Exercise Clause
issues that hostile work environment claims by ministers against
ministers raise.217 Courts would need to intrude on the “realm” of the
church in order to judge the relationship between the ministers because
the “questions of church discipline and the composition of the church
hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern.” 218 Fear of liability
due to workplace environment claims might force a church to behave
differently than its religious mission 219—and, returning to the elements
of a hostile work environment claim, adjudicating whether
discrimination “pervaded” a workplace necessarily would require
“intrusion into a religious thicket”220 The Seventh Circuit summarily
stated that “[t]he First Amendment outlaws such intrusion.”221
Further, interfering with the internal governance of a church is
something that the government simply must not do. 222 The court noted
the difficulties of inquiring into the manner in which Reverend Dada
was controlling the conduct of Mr. Demkovich as a part of his
religious duties as past and what part of his conduct was
discriminatory.223 “How is a court to determine discipline from
discrimination? Or advice from animus?”224 Such questions, the court
opined, are unanswerable without intruding on the church’s Free
Exercise rights.225
216

Id.
Id.
218 Id. quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of America & Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717 (1976).
219 Query whether this is actually true.
220 Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 980, citing Milviojevich, 426 U.S. at 719.
221 Id., citing Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct.
2049, 2060 (2020).
222 Id., quoting Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 678 (7th Cir. 2013) (“civil
authorities have no say over matters of religious governance”).
223 Id.
224 Id., citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 205.
225 Id. at 981. The court discusses this problem in the Free Exercise context,
but I think it might be better discussed in the Establishment Clause context of
entanglement.
217
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Establishment Clause
The court also analyzed the Establishment Clause justifications
for invoking a categorical ministerial exception to hostile work
environment claims. While the level of entanglement that violates the
Establishment Clause must be “excessive,” the court still was
convinced that hostile work environment claims categorically must
involve “government action . . . involv[ing] ‘intrusive government
participation in, supervision of, or inquiry into religious affairs.’” 226
Ultimately, to the en banc panel, the nature of hostile work
environment claims would result in “endless inquiries”227 of whether
individual acts were harassment or based on church doctrine. 228
In addition, the majority further discussed the inability of
secular courts to resolve religious questions.229 While the court pulled
the thread that “[i]nteraction between church and state is
inevitable,”230 the court noted that far less entanglement has been
considered by the Supreme Court to be impermissible entanglement. 231
Further, procedural entanglement is another concern. The court even
pointed out the nature of Mr. Demkovich’s lawsuit as evidence of the
procedural entanglement concern—the case comprised two District

226

Id. at 981 citing Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 995
(7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627,
631 (7th Cir. 2000)).
227 Id., citing Alicea-Hernadez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703
(7th Cir. 2003) (“A hostile work environment claim based on the relationship
between ministers ‘would enmesh the court in endless inquiries as to whether each
discriminatory act was based in Church doctrine or simply secular animus.”).
228 Id. The court also used some language concerning the impropriety of a
judge or jury resolving such claims.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 982 quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
231 Id. One example the court used was public schools allowing prayer before
football games. Id., citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301–30
(2000).
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Court decisions and orders, two motions to dismiss, a panel hearing,
an interlocutory appeal, and finally an en banc rehearing.232
Further, if the ministerial exception did not apply to the church,
the court said that the next best affirmative defense the church could
allege would be one emerging from employment caselaw: namely, that
the employer, in this case the church, “exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly” the problematic behavior, and that
Demkovich “unreasonably failed to take advantage” of those
preventative measures.233 By engaging in that inquiry, “‘every step’
that the church took (or failed to take)” would be closely examined 234
This inquiry drags the court into an area it cannot go by virtue of the
First Amendment.235
Further, the majority acknowledged that churches are not
immune from suit or from regulation in general. 236 Some regulations,
like fire inspections and Fair Labor Standards, are permissible. 237 The
same is true for criminal and tort law—there is generally no immunity
for crimes or torts committed by ministers. 238 Therefore, while the
ministerial exception, in the eyes of the court, extends to hostile work
environment claims, other types of claims relating to the same conduct
“may be independently actionable, as the protection of the ministerial
exception inures to the religious organizations, not to the individuals
within them.”239
232

Id. (“But like the Fourth Circuit, we worry about a “protracted legal process
pitting church and state as adversaries.” [citation] This case's history shows the
prejudicial effects of incremental litigation: two motions to dismiss, two subsequent
decisions and orders, the beginnings of discovery, an interlocutory appeal, a panel
opinion, and now en banc rehearing.”) (citation omitted).
233 See id. at 983, quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998)
234 See id., quoting Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 973
(9th Cir. 2004).
235
See id.
236 Id. at 982.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
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This, it seems, is the heart of the issue decided by the majority.
If a minister commits a tort, that tort is not a direct result of that
protected ministerial relationship. 240 However, in the employment
context, that employment claim goes directly to the heart of the beliefs
of the church. Though the court acknowledged that employment
discrimination statutes “serve ‘undoubtedly important’ societal
interests,”241 even the process of inquiring into the competing interests
between employment law statutes “may impinge on rights guaranteed
by the Religion Clauses.”242 Therefore, the ministerial exception
prevailed—which translated to, in the eyes of the majority, the
ministerial exception precluding all hostile work environment
claims.243
To round out its analysis, the majority opinion analyzed several
ministerial exception cases within the Seventh Circuit244 as well as
those ministerial exception cases in the Ninth 245 and Tenth246 circuits
that concern hostile work environment claims.
The court responded247 to the dissent’s argument that the
“neutral, secular principles of law” theory should apply as it does in
cases that concern “property, contract, tax, and tort cases.”248
However, the court noted that precedent249 to that effect only
concerned outward “outward physical acts,” while the ministerial
exception line of cases concerned matters of internal church
governance.250
240

Id. at 983.
Id., quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196
242 Id., citing NLRB v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
243 See id. at 985.
244 Id. at 983–85
245 See infra at Part III.B.
246 See infra at Part III.B.
247
Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 980.
248 Id. at 980 (quoting Hamilton, J., dissenting, at id. at 993).
249 See id. at 980, citing Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
250 Id.
241
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The ultimate holding of the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc
precluded, as a categorical matter, ministers from bringing hostile
work environment claims against their religious institution employers
and against other ministers. 251 The ultimate takeaway from Demkovich
is that ministers are now precluded from bringing any hostile work
environment claim against their religious institution employers, no
matter the level of severity and no matter the level to which the
offensive conduct is intertwined with religion. 252
PART III : ANALYSIS
Reading Demkovich in tandem with the principles outlined in
Our Lady of Guadalupe and Hosanna-Tabor render the decision
unsurprising.253 However, the question remains whether the sweeping
decision was constitutionally required. Each of the following sections
of this Part, infra, will further probe the Seventh Circuit’s decision:
was it merely permitted by or indeed required by the Religion
Clauses? What can one make of the negative externalities of the
decision?
What the Constitution Requires Versus What It Permits: A Case for
Case-by-Case Analyses
In reading Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, the
decision of the Seventh Circuit seems to agree with what the
251

Id. at 985 (“The First Amendment ministerial exception protects a religious
organization's employment relationship with its ministers, from hiring to firing and
the supervising in between. Adjudicating a minister's hostile work environment
claims based on interaction between ministers would undermine this constitutionally
protected relationship.”).
252 See id.
253 While Hosanna-Tabor specifically declines to apply its reasoning to
employment claims other than wrongful termination claims, the door was left open,
not closed. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012) (“We express no view on whether the exception bars other
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious
conduct by their religious employers.”).
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Constitution permits.254 However, it is not clear that the First
Amendment requires a total bar to workplace harassment claims in the
same way that wrongful termination suits are barred. 255 While it is
clear from the Supreme Court’s precedent that the ministerial
exception is required in every hiring and firing context,256 it is not
clear that the ministerial exception is required in every hostile work
environment context.257 The hiring and firing of a minister directly
intrudes into the ecclesiastical zone into which the government must
not intrude (Free Exercise), and the inquiry into the firing (and the
subsequent investigations of the animating forces behind it) ultimately
will entangle courts with religion in an impermissible manner
(Establishment Clause). 258 Therefore, in the hiring and firing context,
the decision of the court makes complete sense—it must totally be the
prerogative of the church to decide who shall minister to their flock. 259
However, the concerns are less in the hostile work environment
claim. First, the remedies are different260: rather than asking for
reinstatement, the remedy is pecuniary damages for the harms caused
254

See generally id.; Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.
Ct. 2049, 2069 (2020) (both cases stating the importance of the ministerial exception
and the breadth of its reach).
255 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“We express no view on whether the
exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach
of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”)
256 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
257 See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 985–96 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); Bollard v. Cal.
Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999); see also HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
258 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
259 See id., Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2069; see also Bostock v.
Clayton County, Georgia 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
260 Compare Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par. Calumet City, 343 F.
Supp. 3d 772, 776 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), on
reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded
with Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 2017 WL 4339817,
*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2018) (note the difference between remedies requested in
employment discrimination claims and hostile work environment claims).
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during employment.261 Therefore, the concern the court had in the en
banc opinion vis à vis the Free Exercise clause’s prohibition on
requiring the hiring or punishing the firing of a minister is different in
kind between wrongful termination and hostile work environment
claims. Second, as discussed supra at Part I, the twin justifications for
a robust application of the ministerial exception come from the
Religion Clauses.262 However, as the District Court pointed out in
reference to the harassment on the basis of disability Mr. Demkovich
experienced, there was no discernible religious issue at stake. 263 This
is reminiscent of the Ninth Circuit case in which the court held that a
Jesuit novice, who was the victim of sexual harassment by a superior,
was not precluded under the ministerial exception from filing a Title
VII claim against Jesuit order.264 The Jesuit order itself condemned
the action265—and it appears that the same is true for the comments
Reverend Dada made about Mr. Demkovich’s weight: the Church
itself did not claim the comments as religiously motivated.266 Issues
that do not touch on religious principles, even though the actors may
be ministers, should still be subject to claims of workplace harassment.
According to the District Court, the only proper way to properly take
261

See Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. at 776 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 973 F.3d 718
(7th Cir. 2020), on reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part and remanded.
262 See supra at Part I.
263 Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 787–89 aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), on
reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded.
264 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944–46 (9th
Cir. 1999).
265 Id. at 947.
266 See Demkovich, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 787–88 aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), on
reh’g en banc, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded.
(“Here, the Archdiocese offers no religious explanation for the alleged disability
discrimination. The Archdiocese justifies the comments as “reflect[ing] the pastor's
subjective views and/or evaluation of Plaintiff's fitness for his position as a
minister.”).
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account for these non-religious claims brought by ministers is to use a
case-by-case analysis, rather than a categorical bar.
Accordingly, a better approach for the en banc panel to take would
have been to adopt the reasoning of the District Court.267 Rather than
categorically bar hostile work environment claims because of the
potential of entanglement between the government and religion, 268 the
District Court assessed whether the Supreme Court’s formulation of
the ministerial exception necessarily includes hostile work
environment claims.269 To do that, District Court charted the spectrum
of employment claims that could be swept under the umbrella of the
ministerial exception.270 On the one end, the court reasoned, the
Supreme Court has definitely held that it is the complete prerogative
of religious institutions to select and retain their ministers.271 In
addition, other tangible employment actions, though they have not
been discussed by the Supreme Court, have been viewed by other
circuits as covered by the ministerial exception. 272 Tangible
employment actions involving ministers include denial of
promotions,273 reassignments to different and inaccessible churches,274
salary reduction,275 and denial of tenure at a religious university. 276

267

Id.
See id. at 789.
269 Id. at 778–789.
270 See id. at 780–84.
271 Id. at 780–81 (“Supreme Court has made clear that the selection or retention
of a minister is completely off–limits to the courts. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
194–96. The choice of who will minister to the congregation is absolutely protected
by the First Amendment. Id. at 194–95.”).
272 Id. at 781, collecting cases of other circuits re tangible employment actions.
273 See id. at 781, citing Young v. N. Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 21
F.3d 184, 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994).
274 See id., citing Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 21 203
F.3d 1299, 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
275 See id., citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir.
1972).
268
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And, because “when a tangible employment action is challenged by a
minister, the minister is asking a court to directly regulate the
minister’s employment status, which steps directly on the church’s
governance of the minister as a minister.”277 Though tangible
employment actions are do not need to be the hiring or firing of a
minister per se, tangible employment actions are barred by the
ministerial exception.278
In counterpoint, the District Court gestured to the opposite end
of the spectrum where there is no First Amendment issue: employment
claims by non–ministers against religious institutions that do not
concern religious beliefs or doctrines. 279 A non-minister might still be
unsuccessful with their claim if the harassing conduct is motivated by
religion280—but the difference between cases brought by nonministerial employees that are precluded by the First Amendment and
claims that are insulated by the ministerial exception is that the
ministerial exception bars examination of the religious motive,
whereas the non–ministers claims are examined for motive. 281

276

See id., citing E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (concerning minister’s denial of tenure at Catholic University of
America).
277 Id.
278 “Those claims, although not directly challenging a selection or retention of
a minister, still intrude on a church's internal governance of its minister's
employment duties.” Therefore, the claims are barred by the ministerial exception.
Id. at 782.
279 Id.
280 Id. (“But when the religious employer offers a religious justification for the
challenged conduct, then—generally speaking—the First Amendment protects
against the claim, so long as the employer proves that the religious motive is the
actual motive.”).
281 Id. Further, the ministerial exception prohibits courts from requiring a
religious justification to invoke it. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–95 (“The
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a minister
only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the
authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly
ecclesiastical,” Kedroff, 344 U.S., at 119, is the church's alone.”).
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Ultimately, the District Court decided that if a minister brings a
hostile work environment claim that “does not challenge a tangible
employment action and does not pose excessive entanglement with the
religious employer, then the ministerial exception should not
apply.”282 The approach of the District Court better balances the right
of harassed individual employees who happen to be ministers with the
right of the religious institution.
Further, the District Court’s approach is sensitive enough to the
free exercise and entanglement concerns that necessarily attend the
analysis of a decision made by a religious employer. The en banc
panel did not agree: it noted that “the Court declared in HosannaTabor, ‘the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.’”283 This
statement by the court, while punchy, does not accurately capture the
nuance of a hostile work environment claim, nor does it respond to the
dissent’s advocacy of a nuanced approach to the ministerial exception.
The dissent also endorsed the District Court’s approach that
differentiated between tangible employment actions and hostile work
environment claims.284 To support this type of analysis, the dissent
pointed to the First Amendment as interpreted by Bollard, the Ninth
Circuit case which endorsed a case-by-case analysis.285 Rather than
ask what could help churches, the dissent noted, the proper inquiry
should be what is “necessary to comply with the First Amendment.”286
A hostile work environment claim by definition cannot instruct a
church as to who they must or must not hire or fire. 287 Therefore, the
Free Exercise Clause is not implicated in the same way in a hostile
work environment claim as it is in a wrongful termination claim. 288 In
282

Id. at 785.
Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 983 quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
284 Id. at 989 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“The line between tangible
employment actions and hostile environment fits the purposes of the ministerial
exception.”).
285
Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
286 Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting) citing Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947.
287 See the elements of Title VII claim as discussed supra at Part I.
288 The dissenting opinion noted that actions that are “necessary for control” of
ministerial employees fit within tangible employment discrimination claims and
283
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addition, by invoking the ministerial exception a religious institution
will not automatically be free of any entanglement with the courts.
This fear of entanglement by the en banc panel seemed to motivate
much of its opinion. However, as one scholar notes in the case
comment An Exercise in Futility: Does the Intent Required to Apply
the Ministerial Exception to Title VII Defeat Its Purpose?, the irony is
of course that the church will be subject to procedural entanglement
with the court before the ministerial exception is even applied. 289 The
dissent also reminds that the standard for substantive entanglement is
that only “excessive” entanglement violates the First Amendment, and
that entanglement must be “inevitable.”290 Even a third-rail291 and
extremely deferential approach that treats any issue remotely related to
religion as barred by the ministerial exception would be better than a
categorical bar. Indeed, to even reach the point of the application of
the categorical bar, some threshold inquiry must take place to
determine that an employee falls within the “minister” category. A

therefore rightfully fall under the categorical ministerial exception. However,
“[h]ostile environment claims, which are essentially tortious in nature, are by
definition based on actions that are not necessary for effective supervision of
employees.” Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 990 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
289 In the context of defining who is a minister, the Comment notes: “The
ministerial exception thus shifts the focus of litigation from a genuine analysis of
First Amendment concerns to a semantic argument—or worse, a religious
judgment—about the nature of the employee’s role in the religious organization.”
William S. Stickman IV, Comment, An Exercise in Futility: Does the Inquiry
Required to Apply the Ministerial Exception to Title VII Defeat Its Purpose?, 43
DUQ. L. REV. 285, 297–98 (2005).
290 Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 993 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“The more difficult
problems arise here in terms of potential substantive entanglement. Again, though,
we need to keep in mind that some entanglement is “inevitable” and that only
“excessive” entanglement violates the First Amendment. Courts have managed
potential entanglement problems in church litigation across a range of subjects, from
contracts and property disputes to employment disputes, torts, and church elections
and schisms.”) (citation omitted).
291 “Third rail” meaning that any issue that remotely involves religion is like
the third electrified rail on the Chicago Transit Authority: as soon as one touches it,
one must retreat, and fast.
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case–by–case approach must be extremely sensitive to religious issues,
but it need not be a categorical bar to satisfy the Constitution.
Case-By-Case in Other Circuits Appears to Be Working Fine
Both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits were cited in the Seventh
Circuit’s en banc opinion as having confronted the issue of hostile
work environment claims in the ministerial context 292: those two
Circuits took diverging viewpoints on whether a categorical bar or a
case–by–case analysis is called for. 293 The Seventh Circuit adopted the
approach taken by the Tenth Circuit but departed from the Ninth
Circuit.294
The Ninth Circuit opted to use a case-by-case analysis for
ministerial exception claims. In Bollard v. California Province of the
Society of Jesus, a Jesuit novice alleged hostile work environment
claims due to his sexual harassment by his superiors in the Jesuit
order.295 The Ninth Circuit allowed his claim to go through because
the twin justifications of the Religion Clauses were not at issue in the
case.296
First, the Free Exercise Clause was sufficiently not at issue in
Bollard. Because the question raised about the Jesuit’s sexual
harassment did not impact the “Jesuit order’s choice of
representative,” there was no free exercise concern. 297 Further

292

Id. at 984–85.
See id. at 984.
294 Id.
295 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944–45, 950
(9th Cir. 1999).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 947 (“Moreover, this is not a case about the Jesuit order's choice of
representative, a decision to which we would simply defer without further inquiry.
Bollard does not complain that the Jesuits refused to ordain him or engaged in any
other adverse personnel action. On the contrary, according to the allegations in
Bollard's complaint, the Jesuit order has enthusiastically encouraged Bollard's
pursuit of the priesthood.”) (citations omitted).
293
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evidence of this was the fact that the Jesuit order itself condemned the
harassment.298
Second, the Establishment Clause was sufficiently not at issue in
Bollard. The procedural entanglement concern was not present
because, as the dissenting judge noted in the en banc opinion,
“[f]inding there would be no greater entanglement than in other private
civil suits against a church, the Ninth Circuit found no constitutional
barrier to the sexual harassment claim that did not challenge any
tangible employment action.”299 As for substantive entanglement, the
Ninth Circuit noted that for the same reasons that Free Exercise Clause
concerns are not implicated in Bollard, neither are substantive
entanglement concerns 300: there was no issue with respect to the
church’s endorsement of the sexual harassment: it condemned it. 301
Therefore, the court would not be analyzing the Jesuit religious
organization’s viewpoints because all parties were in agreement about
the conduct.302
The Ninth Circuit opinion demonstrated that it is possible for a
case-by-case regime to take stock of the religious interests in an
unobtrusive way.303 In the oral argument before the Seventh Circuit
sitting en banc, Judge Hamilton drilled straight to the heart of the issue
in asking counsel for the church: “Is there any sign that religious
liberty is less robust in the Ninth Circuit in these last twenty years
298

Id. at 947 (“In this case, as in the case of lay employees, the Free Exercise
rationales supporting an exception to Title VII are missing. The Jesuits do not offer a
religious justification for the harassment Bollard alleges; indeed, they condemn it as
inconsistent with their values and beliefs. There is thus no danger that, by allowing
this suit to proceed, we will thrust the secular courts into the constitutionally
untenable position of passing judgment on questions of religious faith or doctrine.”).
299 Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 988 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
300 Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949 (“But as we have explained above in discussing
the Free Exercise Clause, such substantive concerns are absent from this case.”).
301 Id. at 947.
302 See id.
303 See id.; see also Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 986 (Hamilton, J., dissenting)
(“[Ninth Circuit balancing approach a]llows churches ample power to select, control,
and supervise their ministers while protecting employees from abuses that are not
properly within the scope of anyone's employment.”).
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since that decision than the rest of the country?” 304 The church’s
counsel responded that he could not provide an empirical answer, but
that the true effect would be the “chilling” of religious institutions
from disciplining their pastors. 305 It appears, then, from the Ninth
Circuit’s treatment of the hostile work environment issue in the
ministerial context, that courts are able to meaningfully and
respectfully handle sensitive religious issues as they do often in other
cases.306
Under a Categorical Approach the Harms Outweigh the Potential
Benefits
Following from the idea that the Constitution does not necessarily
require a categorical bar to workplace harassment claims, the query
arises as to whether the harms of a categorical bar outweigh the
benefits conferred upon religious liberty. As the dissent noted, the real
negative externalities of the Demkovich decision seem to outweigh the
possible positive ones.307 All of this conduct, as evidenced by the
dismissal of Mr. Demkovich’s case, would not be reachable by
ministerial plaintiffs.308
Mr. Demkovich was harassed while at his workplace with
epithets that discriminated against him on the basis of his sex, sexual
orientation, and disability. The Seventh Circuit’s holding permitted the
church to escape liability for conduct that would otherwise have been
304

Recording of Oral Argument at 23:45, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the
Apostle Par. Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021) (No. No. 19–2142), available
at https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2021/ds.19-2142.192142_02_09_2021.mp3.
305 Id. at 23:50 (counsel speaking).
306 See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 988 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“Churches and
their leaders are already accountable in civil courts for many similar sorts of claims.
Courts already navigate these waters with more attention to nuance and less reliance
on absolute immunities. Religious liberty still thrives.”).
307 Id. at 994 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (section entitled “Consequences and
Stakes”).
308 Id. at 985.
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attributed to the church had it not been a religious employer. An
exchange between Judge Hamilton, Judge Rovner, and the counsel for
the church during the oral argument before the en banc court is
illuminating as to the thinking of the church 309:
Counsel for Church: “A court can’t really sit in
judgment of those words chosen
[by a church to discipline its
employees]”
Judge Hamilton:
“Words like—words like fags
and bitches.”
Counsel for Church: “I’m not here to endorse those
words, we condemn them. But
by the same token a court should
not be sitting in judgment of the
words chosen. That’s really the
principle of the argument.”
Judge Rovner:
“Not even those words? Not
even those words?”
Counsel for Church: “Not even those words . . . .”310
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hamilton specifically outlined
example cases of egregious harassment that would no longer have an
employment law remedy under the Seventh Circuit’s rule 311:
employees being subjected to racial epithets,312 sexual abuse,313 threats
of physical violence,314 racially based harassment, 315 and supervisors
309

Recording of Oral Argument at 27:39–28:13, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the
Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021) (No. 19–2142), available at
https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2021/ds.19–2142.19–2142_02_09_2021.mp3.
310 Id.
311 Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 994 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
312 Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting) citing Gates v. Bd. of Educ., 916 F.3d 631,
637–39 (7th Cir. 2019).
313 Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting) citing Smith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc., 898 F.3d
747, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2018).
314 Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting) citing Smith, 898 F.3d at 749–50.
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forcing their subordinates to view pornography. 316 Under the
sweeping view of the categorical bar, ministers who are the victims of
such types of discrimination will not have any access to bring
employment–based litigation.317
Scholars have also considered the impact of the ministerial
exception on other types of workplace related claims. One such
example is whistleblower retaliation claims.318 One scholar suggested
that by applying the ministerial exception, there is a “strong
presumption” that whistleblower suits would also be barred.” 319 In a
world where the exposure of sexual abuse of minors at the hands of
religious leaders is increasingly commonplace, the broad impact of the
categorical prohibition appears in starker relief. 320
However, there appear to be some benefits to the approach that
the en banc panel took. Guaranteeing religious freedom is a good
thing. And so is having predictability in the law. While this Comment
argues that the en banc opinion should have adopted the District
Court’s reasoning by using a case-by-case approach, rather than a
categorical approach, to hostile work environment claims, 321 this
Comment does not argue that the Seventh Circuit made a legal error in
its determination that the ministerial exception bars. Rather, the
Seventh Circuit did what it could with the existing Supreme Court
315

Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting), citing Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576
F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2009); Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1042–43
(7th Cir. 2002).
316 Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting) citing Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d
412, 417 (7th Cir. 1989).
317 Id. at 985 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
318 See Jarod S. Gonzalez, At the Intersection of Religious Organization
Missions and Employment Laws: The Case of Minister Employment Suits, 65 CATH.
U.L. REV. 303, 306 (2015).
319 See id.
320 See, e.g., Aurelien Breeden, Over 200,000 Minors Abused by Clergy in
France Since 1950, Report Estimates, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/05/world/europe/france-catholic-churchabuse.html (last updated Nov. 8, 2021).
321 See discussion, supra, at Part III.1.
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precedent that exists. The fact of the matter is that the ministerial
exception in the Title VII context is exceedingly broad.322 The court
chose to err on the side of caution in the religious freedom context. 323
Undoubtedly, the freedom of religion impacts all—religious and not.
The freedom to believe, or not believe, encourages freedom of
thought. That same freedom of thought is the lifeblood of the
American experiment. The right of churches and religious institutions
to decide who their ministers are is, of course, inalienable. However,
where religious institutions use constitutional rights as shelters to
avoid responsibility for their ministers, well, that is a different beast
entirely.
Other Ways Forward
One final note: the story of workplace harassment does not begin
and end with Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities act. As
discussed in Part I, the concern for ecclesiastical independence is not a
blanket immunity for employees of churches to commit torts and
crimes.324 Further, contractual relationships generally appear to be
enforceable against religious institutions, even where the parties are
minister and church.325 For practicing lawyers, the time spent bringing
a hostile work environment or other type of employment claim
blocked by the ministerial exception, at least until the U.S. Supreme
322

See generally Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct.
2049 (2020).
323 See generally Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
324 See id. at 982 (“And as far as we can tell, no court has held that the
ministerial exception protects against criminal or personal tort liability. Nor do we. If
a minister's allegations rise to those levels, they may be independently actionable, as
the protection of the ministerial exception inures to the religious organizations, not
to the individuals within them.”).
325 See Jarod S. Gonzalez, At the Intersection of Religious Organization
Missions and Employment Laws: The Case of Minister Employment Suits, 65 CATH.
U.L. REV. 303, 314 (2015) (see section I.A, “Breach of Contract Claims”: “Both pre
and post–Hosanna-Tabor courts have distinguished minister employment
discrimination and retaliation suits from minister breach of contract suits under the
First Amendment based on the voluntary principle.”).
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Court better clarifies its contours, might be better spent elsewhere.
Possible locations include bulking up employment contracts between
religious institutions and its employers or crafting tort suits that, even
though they may retain the same character as an employment
discrimination suit, might yield better results for the minister. 326
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded a
marathon run of litigation comprising two U.S. District Court
opinions, an interlocutory appeal and a decision by a three-judge panel
of the Seventh Circuit that was overturned by the Seventh Circuit
sitting en banc. The court erred on the side of religious liberty in its en
banc decision concerning Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle
Church, Calumet City. By instituting a categorical bar on hostile
workplace claims by ministers, the Seventh Circuit prioritized an
idealized religious liberty while trusting other remedies such as tort
and contract to protect the rights of ministerial workers.
Yes, religious liberty has lived to see another day in the Seventh
Circuit by virtue of the categorical bar. However, as shown in the
Ninth Circuit, a case-by-case analysis might have been just the ticket
to protect religious liberty while also giving plaintiffs their day in
court for non-religious-entangling employment issues. At the end of
the day, the loser here was Mr. Demkovich. He endured humiliation
and heartache at the hands of his employer with his claims of
harassment being summarily dismissed. While a case-by-case analysis
complicates the analysis of judges and lawyers, it would have at least
allowed Mr. Demkovich to get past the 12(b)(6) stage. There is no
easy balance to be struck where one side of the balance is an injured
plaintiff and the other religious liberty. However, perhaps Chief
326 See Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 988 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“[D]efendants and
all members of this court agree that even ministerial employees may assert tort
claims against supervising ministers and churches as institutions. On–the–job
conduct that supports statutory claims for hostile environment discrimination may
also amount to torts, including assault and battery (when abuse is physical) and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
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Justice Roberts was right: “the First Amendment has struck the
balance for us.”327

327

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196, quoted in Demkovich, 3 F.4th 968 at 983.
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